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Traditional explanations for trade misinvoicing -- high custom duties 
and weak domestic     economies —   are less persuasive in a world of    high 
growth emerging markets who have low trade barriers. We construct a 35-
country data set over a 26 year  span,  covering  both   industrialised  and   
developing  countries,  to  study  the phenomena   of   export   and   import   
misinvoicing.   Capital   account   openness, differentials  in  interest  rates,  
political   stability,  corruption,  indebtedness  and  the exchange  rate  regime  
are  identified  as   factors   related  to  misinvoicing.  Trade misinvoicing should 
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The magnitude of trade misinvoicing is conventionally estimated by juxtaposing 
trade data from the importing and the exporting country. A firm interested in moving 
capital out of a country would underinvoice its exports, thus bringing reduced foreign 
exchange into the country. Similarly, overinvoicing of imports would allow the domestic 
importer to gain access to greater foreign exchange than required. Both these 
mechanisms leave domestic firms in control of hard currency assets overseas. 
Underinvoicing of imports, on the other hand, can result from an attempt to evade taxes 
on imports including customs duties and the VAT on imports. 
 
The overall misinvoicing of imports that is computed using macroeconomic data 
reflects a certain cancelling out between certain firms who are engaged in 
underinvoicing of imports and other firms who are engaged in overinvoicing of imports. 
Similar considerations apply with misinvoicing of exports. To the extent that firms have 
heterogeneous goals, the measured misinvoicing is likely to understate the true scale of 
gross capital flows being achieved through misinvoicing in an economy. 
 
The traditional literature focussed on two broad motivations for misinvoicing. 
First, it emphasised high customs duties (de Boyrie et. al., 2007; Boyce and Ndikumana, 
2001; Beja et. al., 2005): When firms pay high rates of customs duties or VAT on imports, 
they have an incentive to understate the true value of imports. Second, misinvoicing was 
viewed as a method for achieving capital flight, which was (in turn) motivated by fears of 
expropriation in an interplay between unsound economic policy and political instability 
(Schulze, 1994). 
 
A critical factor influencing trade misinvoicing that has been identified in the 
literature is the extent of exchange rate overvaluation. An overvalued exchange rate as 
well as high inflation rate raise expectations of depreciation in the near future and 
stimulate capital flight. Research on the determinants of the large outflows of capital from 
Latin American countries in 1980s and Asian economies in late 1990s has identified 
explanatory variables such as macroeconomic instability, large budget deficits, low 
growth rates and the spread between foreign and domestic interest rates (Cuddington, 
1987; Muscatelli and Hallett, 1992; Pastor, 1990; Cuddington, 1986; Vos, 1992; Boyce, 
2002; Ketkar and Ketkar, 1989). These factors, as well as others such as corruption, 
political freedom and accountability were significant in explaining capital flight from sub 
Saharan Africa (Ngeno, 2000; Murinde et al. 1996; Hermes and Lensink, 1992; 
Ndikumana and Boyce, 2002). 
 
By the logic of this traditional literature, when countries like India and China 
achieved high GDP growth and cut customs duties, the motivation for misinvoicing 
should have subsided. In this paper, we find that by and large, such a decline in 
misinvoicing is not visible. Hence, there is a need to review the evidence for 
misinvoicing, including countries with stable political systems and robust economic 
growth, in a period with low trade barriers, in a quest for alternative explanations. That 
analysis is undertaken in this paper. 
 
The recent literature has identified interesting links between trade and capital  
account openness. Aizenman (2003) and Aizenman and Noy (2004) describe the two-
way links between trade liberalisation and capital account liberalisation. Aizenman 
(2004) in countries that have capital account restrictions, greater trade integration 
creates greater opportunities to shift capital through trade misinvoicing. Conversely, Wei 
and Zhang (2007) show that capital controls impede trade. These factors may generate 
a causal relationship between greater trade openness and capital account liberalisation. 
Aizenman and Noy (2008) find that a one standard deviation increase in trade openness 
is associated with 9.5% increase in financial openness. 
 
The contribution of this paper lies in a fresh examination of the evidence on 
misinvoicing with a broader dataset than has been generally used. Most of the existing 
literature has focused on countries from Africa and Latin America. We extend the data set 
by looking at a number of countries from South and East Asia, as well as Eastern Europe. 
We include a number of industrialized countries in our data set, which have not featured 
in most of the existing literature on capital flight. We examine variables such as custom 
duties, tax rates, political stability, economic stability, law and order, etc. as potential 
determinants of trade misinvoicing. We also analyse misinvoicing from the viewpoint of de 
facto openness of the current and capital accounts. We report evidence about the extent 
to which misinvoicing is motivated by the desire to avoid capital controls, and the extent 
to which it constitutes an important element of de facto convertibility. 
 
Our results suggest that trade misinvoicing should be seen as one element of de 
facto openness on the capital account. Economic agents who desire capital movements 
for traditional reasons such as financial portfolio diversification, bets on exchange rate 
movements, are likely to achieve these movements through trade misinvoicing. To the 
extent that misinvoicing is feasible, countries do not have a choice about embarking on 
high capital account openness once they have adopted high current account openness. 
Thus, we link the older literature on trade misinvoicing with the considerable literature 
from the following decades on capital account liberalisation by emerging markets. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we describe our 
method of measuring misinvoicing and the resulting dataset. Simple graphical analysis is 
shown in Section 3 and Section 4 examines the data using regression models. Section 5 
presents the key results of both the graphical and regression analyses, while Section 6 
concludes and proposes avenues for further research. 
 
  
II. Measuring Misinvoicing: The Methodology 
 
 
Trade misinvoicing can take place either through export and import 
overinvoicing or underinvoicing. Ideally, the observed exports from country A to country 
B (including the cost of insurance and shipping (CIF)) should match the observed 
imports of Country B from Country A. If the exports from Country A to B (CIF) are less 
than the claimed imports of Country B from A, then the difference can be attributed to 
export underinvoicing by Country A, or import overinvoicing by Country B. 
 
Discrepancies between data from an importer and the data from the exporter 
could be attributed to mistakes in recordkeeping. However, if the errors in record  
keeping take place randomly and have mean zero, then averaging these across millions 
of containers should yield very small discrepancies at an aggregate level. When 
industrial countries trade with industrial countries, it is likely that record-keeping on both 
sides is done using high quality computer systems. Hence, random errors in 
measurement are likely to be smaller. 
 
The data on misinvoicing used in earlier studies was usually limited to a few 
countries or a continent. We construct a dataset for 53 major countries
i (18 industrialized 
countries and 35 developing countries) over a span of 26 years (1980-2005) and 
evaluate the extent of trade misinvoicing in each country in the dataset against 
industrialized countries. By looking at both industrialized and developing countries we 
are able to identify the varying factors affecting capital mobility through trade 
misinvoicing. 
 
We measure trade misinvoicing by using data from IMF’s  Data on Trade 
Statistics  (DOTS). The DOTS database reports bilateral merchandise exports and 
imports data between trading partners. Misinvoicing is calculated by looking at the 
bilateral export and import data between individual countries and their trading partner. 
The aggregate GDP of countries in the data set works out to 95% of global GDP in 
exchange rate terms and 91% of GDP in terms of purchasing power parity. We focus on 
the misinvoicing implicit in trade data of a given country against industrial countries only. 
To the extent that industrial country trade statistics are more accurately captured, this is 
expected to be less noisy. This biases the interpretation of our overall results: the true 
scale of capital flows through misinvoicing against the world would be bigger when 
compared with the values seen here. 
 
  
We measure misinvoicing in country i vis-á-vis  its industrialized trading 
partners as follows: 
 
 Xmisit = Mjt — (Xit * cif)    (I) 
 Mmisit =  Mit  — (Xjt * cif)                                                                             (II) 
 
 
Equation (I) measures export misinvoicing by country i in year t, where Mjt 
refers to imports of industrialized country j from country i in year t as reported by country 
j. Xit  refers to exports of country i to industrialized country j in year t as reported by 
country  i. cif refers to the ratio of cif to fob. A positive value of Xmisit would indicate 
export underinvoicing by country i in year t. On similar lines, a positive value of Mmisit  in 
equation (II) would reflect import overinvoicing by country i in year t. The misinvoicing 
figures for country i are arrived at by applying equations I and II to all the industrialized 
trading partners of country.i 
 
 
III. Graphical Analysis 
 
  
We now present a graphical analysis of misinvoicing in this dataset, from two 
perspectives. In section 3.1, we compare the extent of misinvoicing in developing and  
industrialized countries over the period 1980-2005. In sections 3.2 and 3.3, we take a 
look at some of the observed relationships between both export and import 
misinvoicing and few of the key macroeconomic and institutional variables that are 




3.1  Misinvoicing in Industrialized v/s Developing Countries 
 
 
In the modern period, where industrial countries have near-zero customs 
duties and near-zero barriers to capital mobility, we would expect to get small values 
for misinvoicing for trade between industrial countries and industrial countries. If we 
maintain a null hypothesis that zero trade misinvoicing is indeed present, then the 
distribution of estimated misinvoicing that is obtained between industrial countries and 













(a) Export Misinvoicing vis-à-vis ICs                    (b) Import Misinvoicing vis-à-vis ICs 
 
 
(c) Export Misinvoicing vis-à-vis World               (d) Import Misinvoicing vis-à-vis World 
 
 
Figure 1 describes the kernel density plots of export and import misinvoicing 
measures. Figures (a) and (b) show misinvoicing vis-a-vis industrial countries, while (c) 
and (d) show misinvoicing vis-a-vis the rest of the world. The solid black line 
represents the density plot for industrialized countries, while the dashed line refers to 
the developing countries. The vertical lines exhibit the 2.5% and 97.5% boundaries for 
the industrialized countries. 
 
Comparing the density plots of the developing countries with the industrialized 
countries, it is evident that a sizeable proportion of observations for developing 
countries lie outside the 95% interval for the industrialized countries. This pattern is 


















   
as the world. Thus, the extent of misinvoicing seems to be significantly higher among developing countries 
compared to industrialized countries. Even if we maintain a null hypothesis that no misinvoicing takes place 
between industrial and industrial trade partners, the evidence for developing countries clearly rejects the null 
hypothesis that misinvoicing is absent when it comes to developing countries. 
 
Figure 2: Export Misinvoicing as a percentage of Exports (1980-2005) 
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(e) Brazil  (f) Indonesia 
 































The extent of misinvoicing has steadily decreased in industrialized countries 
over the last 25 years. Figure 2 traces the path of export misinvoicing across six 
countries - three industrialized countries and three emerging markets. Around 1980, 
the United States was experiencing export underinvoicing worth of more than 14% of 
its exports. However, over the next 25 years this has steadily declined to less than one 
percent in 2005. Similarly, Italy and France, which experienced capital flight through 
export underinvoicing in early 1980s saw a reversal in its trend since 1992 as capital 
started flowing into these economies through trade misinvoicing. A similar pattern of 
decline in capital flight through export misinvoicing was also witnessed in other 
industrialized countries like Spain, Netherlands, Finland and Canada. The experience 
with industrial country misinvoicing is broadly consistent with the dates of capital 
account liberalisation by industrial countries; this suggests that once capital account 
restrictions are eliminated, the motivation for trade misinvoicing subsides. 
 
In contrast, the decline in capital flight through export underinvoicing in 
developing countries was nowhere as dramatic as in the industrialized countries. In 
fact, the evidence from developing countries is quite mixed. While some countries like 
India and Philippines witnessed a decline in export misinvoicing between 1980 and 
2005, others like Brazil, Chile and Colombia did not experience a significant decline. 
On the other hand, several countries like Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia saw an 
increase in export misinvoicing. The broad empirical facts for developing countries are 
consistent with the prevalence of restrictions against capital mobility. 
 
Focussing on import underinvoicing also yields a simailar picture where the 
developed countries witnessed a strong decline in capital flight through import 
underinvoicing during the period 1980-2005, whereas the developing countries provide 























3.2 Export  Misinvoicing 
 



















(e) Capital Account Openness 
 
 
Figure 3 measures the extent of export underinvoicing on the vertical axis. A 
higher number indicates greater capital flight through export underinvoicing with the 
industrialized countries, that is, the exporting country is claiming that it has exported less 
than what is being reported as having been imported by importing countries. 
 
We find that higher capital flight tends to be associated with more corrupt 
countries (Figure 3a). For example, countries like Nigeria, Pakistan and Ukraine that rank 
as most corrupt countries according to our measure are also the countries that witness 
maximum capital flight. 
 
Countries that have high custom duties have also experienced more capital flight 
through underinvoicing of exports (Figure 3 b). A prime example in this case is India, 
where custom duties averaged in excess of 27% during the period under study and 
capital flight through export underinvoicing amounted to 15% of the country’s  total 
exports. On the other hand, industrialized countries like Australia, Ireland, Spain, etc., 
which virtually abolished custom duties during the same period, witnessed very limited 
capital flight from underinvoicing of exports. 
 
Greater political stability tends to be related with lower misinvoicing of exports. 
Quan Vu Le and Paul Zak (2001) have found for a sample of 47 developing countries 
that unconstitutional government change, internal uprisings and the variance of policy 
implementation exert a positive influence on capital flight. Boyce and Ndikumana (2003), 
in their study on capital flight from Sub-Saharan African countries find the estimated co-
efficients of political and governance indicators to have the expected signs. The 
relationship, however, is not statistically significant.  
 
There is a positive relationship between external indebtedness and misinvoicing 
(Figure 3d). The evidence from African countries has shown that typically the 
government engages in foreign borrowing from donor countries and multilateral 
agencies, while the private sector shifts funds abroad. Moreover, the drain of foreign 
exchange resources through capital flight creates further demand for external borrowing. 
Khan and Ul-Haque (1985) point out that in developing countries the perceived risk of 
investment is higher than in industrialized countries. Residents of developing countries 
can expect risk-free compensation for the additional risk on their investment at home. 
Khan and Ul-Haque (1985) call this expropriation risk, implying that residents of these 
countries can have their assets expropriated by the government through outright 
nationalization, taxes, or exchange controls, whereas, the risk on similar assets held 
abroad is negligible. Consequently, an exogenous or policy-induced shock that raises 
the perceived level of risk could result in capital flight. 
 
Capital account liberalization mitigates capital flight by reducing market 
distortions. Also, with an open capital account capital flight is likely to take place through 
the capital account. Consequently, a country with an open capital account, even if it 
witnesses capital flight, is not likely to see it happen through trade misinvoicing. However, 
if financial markets are repressed then capital account liberalization can have adverse 
consequences. With domestic interest rates being significantly lower than foreign interest 
rates, domestic agents will have the incentive to hold their wealth in foreign assets. 
Moreover, the liberalization of capital account operations if the exchange rate is 
overvalued, can lead to higher capital flight. In our sample of countries, we find that 
greater capital account openness is associated with lower export misinvoicing. 
 
3.3 Import  Misinvoicing 
 
Next, we consider the case where capital flight takes place through overinvoicing 
of imports, that is, the importing country has claimed it has imported more than what the 
exporting countries have exported. We find that corruption and capital account openness 
exert limited influence on capital flight through import overinvoicing. Higher custom duties 
are associated with lower overinvoicing of imports. Typically, in countries with high 
custom duties, importers will have the incentive to declare a lower worth of their goods to 
avoid paying these duties.  








(b) Customs Duties  
 
 










(e) Capital Account Openness 
 
 
Political stability continues to be associated with capital flight in the expected 
direction. More stable countries witness lower import overinvoicing limiting the extent of 
capital flight. Finally, we obtain the rather surprising relationship between indebtedness 
and import overinvoicing. More indebted countries are found to engage in lower import 
overinvoicing. A closer look at the countries reveals that this result is largely driven by 
Philippines as well as Latin American economies like Argentina and Peru, which have 
witnessed high levels of external indebtedness but have experienced relatively modest 
capital flight through import misinvoicing. 
 
 
IV. Regression Analysis 
 
 
In this section, we use regression analysis to study the principal determinants of 
cross-country variation in the level of trade misinvoicing over the period 1980 to 2005. 
Our primary dependent variable is trade misinvoicing measured as export underinvoicing 
as well as import overinvoicing vis-á-vis industrialized countries. 
 
Apart from the variables introduced in Section 3, we also look at a number of 
other variables that can influence capital flight
iii. Countries with high current account 
deficit are likely to experience capital moving off to foreign shores. A persistent current 
account deficit can be looked upon as a manifestation of economic instability and 
induces capital owners to transfer resources to foreign shores. A country that is faced 
with persistent current account deficit is likely to undertake a devaluation to improve the  
current account balance. Alternatively, it can raise resources internally by engineering a 
transfer from the private sector. This can happen either by direct 
appropriation/nationalization of private assets or generating seignorage revenue through 
an inflation tax. In either of the cases the private sector will have the incentive to move 
its assets beyond the control of the government. 
 
Capital flight also tends to occur in countries, which have low political stability. 
Politically less stable countries such as Nigeria and Zimbabwe have experienced a 
substantial volume of capital flight through import misinvoicing. Political instability causes 
capital flight as agents seek to minimize the risk of expropriation and future portfolio 
losses due to political crisis. 
 
Capital is likely to illegally move from home country to a foreign country if the 
returns are higher in the latter. To evaluate this possibility we look at both the real 
interest rate prevailing in the home country as well as the real interest rate spread. While 
the real interest rate is calculated by looking at the difference between the deposit rates 
prevailing in a country and the inflation rate, the real interest rate spread is the difference 
between real deposit rates in the home country and a risk free real interest rate. We 
proxy the risk free real interest rate with real deposit rates prevailing in the United 
States
iv. One would expect capital flight to be inversely related with real deposit rates 
and positively related with real interest rate spread. 
 
Tables 1 and 3 display the regression results employing feasible generalized 
least squares estimation. We allow for the presence of AR (1) autocorrelation within 
panels and a heteroscedastic error structure. While Table 1 illustrates the principal 
determinants of capital flight through export underinvoicing vis-a-vis  industrialized 
countries, Table 3 highlights principal predictors of capital flight through overinvoicing of 
imports with industrialized countries. Looking across Tables 1 and 3 it is evident that 
while countries can engage in capital flight through both export underinvoicing and 
import overinvoicing, the underlying factors driving these are quite different.  
  
 
Table 1: FGLS Estimates: Determinants of Export Underinvoicing 
 
Dependent Variable: Share of Export Underinvoicing in Exports to Industrialised 
Countries 
   I II III IV V  VI 
Current Account 0.267*** 0.221*** 0.204** 0.203** 0.152* 0.083
Deficit [3.311] [2.770] [2.550] [2.449] [1.900] [0.667]
Capital Account -1.326** -1.137** -1.298** -1.039*- 0.854** -1.423**
Openness [-2.349] [-2.060] [-2.324] [-1.675] [-1.992] [-1.982]
Customs Duty 0.026 0.198 0.177 0.169 0.312** 0.333**
[0.177] [1.305] [1.252] [0.985] [2.287] [2.150]
Political Stability -0.079*- 0.074*- 0.087** -0.071*- 0.094** 0.107*
[-1.717] [-1.811] [-2.090] [-1.700] [-2.054] [1.702]
Real Interest Rate -0.015 -0.021 -0.007 0.016 0.040
[-0.411] [-0.518] [-0.181] [0.453] [0.920]
Log of Inflation 0.127 0.217 0.194 0.32
[0.606] [1.084] [0.936] [0.564]
Exchange Rate -0.083
Rigidity [-0.408]




Rho 0.81  0.81 0.77 0.76 0.75  0.75 
No. of Countries  36  34  34  34  33  17 
 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. 
*** indicates significance at 1% 
** indicates significance at 5%  
* indicates significance at 10% 
Columns I to VI indicate different sets of countries. Missing values in the columns reflect absence 
of data for those variables in that set of countries.  
 
 
One of the key determinants of capital flight through export underinvoicing is the 
extent of current account deficit. This variable is significant across almost all the 
specifications outlined in Table 1. A one percentage point increase in the ratio of current 
account deficit to GDP raises capital flight through export underinvoicing by 0.15 to 0.26 
percentage points. A higher current account deficit raises the probability of devaluation of 
the domestic currency, and reduces the incentive to invest in domestic assets. In such 
circumstances, investors seek out different routes to acquire foreign assets. 
 
A rise in capital account openness is associated with a strong and significant 
decline in export overinvoicing. As countries undertake greater integration with the global 
financial market, allowing domestic residents to buy and sell foreign assets, the incentive 
to take out capital through trade misinvoicing diminishes. An increase in the capital 
account liberalization index by 0.1 points, by modifying laws to allow freer movement of 
capital, results in lowering export misinvoicing by 0.8 to 1.3 percentage points. 
 
Apart from the above direct impact on capital flight, liberalization of the capital  
account can influence the extent of capital flight through what Kose et al. (2006) term as 
’potential collateral benefits’ of financial integration. Liberalization of the capital account 
can act as a catalyst for imposing discipline on macroeconomic policy. With financial 
globalization, the threat of capital outflow, in the face of opportunistic policies, acts as a 
’disciplining effect’ for the policymaker. Thus, an open capital account induces 
policymakers to undertake and adhere to good policies. As pointed out by Tytell and Wei 
(2004) these include national competition policy, regulation of banks, equity and labour 
markets and finally, monetary and fiscal policy. Several papers like Tytell and Wei (2004), 
Gruben and McLeod (2002) and Razin and Yuen (1995) have argued that capital account 
openness appears to lower inflation by disciplining monetary authorities. Similarly, Kim 
(2003) goes on to argue that capital account liberalization is associated with a lower fiscal 
deficit. Finally, countries with better institutions tend to have fewer restrictions on capital 
account transactions: capital account liberalisation is often correlated with improvements 
in institutional capacity in the country. For these reasons, there is a need for caution in 
interpreting the causal link between de jure capital account liberalisation and 
misinvoicing. 
 
Adherence to good policies like low inflation and fiscal deficit increases the 
economic stability of the country and boosts the confidence of investors to hold assets 
within the country thereby reducing the extent of capital flight. 
 
On the other hand, increased trade openness is associated with greater capital 
flight. Export misinvoicing increases by about 0.8 percentage points with an increase in 
trade openness of one percentage point. A larger tradeable sector offers greater 
opportunities for agents to misinvoice trade, with the objective of moving capital outside 
the country. 
 
Political stability also shows up as a significant predictor of capital flight and has 
a strong negative influence on export underinvoicing. Typically, in countries with low 
political stability, residents take out their money to avoid the possibility that government in 
some form can erode the future value of such holdings. Higher customs duties are also 
associated with higher capital flight although the impact is not significant across all 
specifications. On the other hand, real interest rate, inflation rate and exchange rate 
regime do not have a significant impact on export underinvoicing. 
 
Finally, we find that countries with higher external indebtedness have 
experienced greater capital flight. A number of reasons have been forwarded for the 
positive association between capital flight and external debt. Debt disbursements can 
signal an increase in the probability of a fiscal crisis and induce capital flight. Provision of 
external debt is also likely to put upward pressure on domestic currency, motivating 








Table 2: FGLS Estimates: Determinants of Export Underinvoicing (Sub Sample Analysis) 
Dependent Variable: Share of Export Underinvoicing in Exports to Industrialized Countries 
  Industrialized Countries  Developing Countries 



















































































































     -0.191 
[-0.714] 




       -0.059 
[-1.642] 
      
Indebtedness                  
rho 0.73  0.74  0.69  0.72  0.68  0.85  0.83  0.81  0.61 
Number of 
Countries 
11 11  11  11  11  25  23  23 23 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. 
*** indicates significance at 1%, ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
Columns I to IX indicate different sets of countries. Missing values in the columns reflect absence of data for those 




Focusing on subsamples and looking specifically at the industrialized and 
developing countries separately one can see that the overall results are largely driven by 
the performance of the developing countries. For the industrialized countries, customs 
duty and real interest rate show up as key predictors of export misinvoicing. The positive 
relationship between customs duty and export underinvoicing is largely driven by 
countries like Australia and Japan, which maintained relatively high customs duties. On 
the other hand, in developing countries, export underinvoicing can largely be explained 
by capital account openness, political stability and trade openness. Countries like 
Singapore, Czech Republic, Ireland and Peru had undertaken significant liberalization of 
the capital account over the last two decades and witnessed diminishing capital flight 
through export misinvoicing during this period. Countries like India, Philippines and 
Columbia, however, which moved relatively little on liberalization of capital account  
during most of this period, witnessed strong capital flight through trade misinvoicing. 
More politically stable countries like Singapore, Czech Republic and Korea witnessed 
lower misinvoicing compared to countries like Pakistan, Nigeria and Algeria. Finally, 
trade openness also shows up as a significant predictor of trade misinvoicing among 
developing countries. 
  
Next, when we focus on the key determinants of capital flight through import 
overinvoicing, the results are quite different from above. The current account deficit 
continues to be a significant determinant of capital flight through import overinvoicing. 
Again, across all specifications it exerts a significant positive impact on trade 
misinvoicing. However, both capital account openness and political stability do not have 
a significant impact on trade misinvoicing. Customs duties now show up as a strong 
determinant of import overinvoicing. Higher custom duties exert a strong negative 
impact on the desire to overinvoice and the effect is significant across all specifications. 
By reporting a lower value of shipment, traders are able to evade import tariffs or 
custom duties, avoid quotas, and launder illegally obtained money, and engage in 
capital flight. We find that a one percentage point increase in custom duties reduces 
import overinvoicing by around 0.3 percentage points. 
 
 
Table 3: FGLS Estimates: Determinants of Import Overinvoicing 
Dependent Variable: Share of Import Overinvoicing in Imports to Industrialised Countries 





















































































Real Interest Rate 
Differential 






Indebtedness           -0.026 
[-0.357] 
rho 0.79  0.79  0.80 0.72 0.74  0.74 
Number of Countries  33  33  33  33  33  16 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. 
*** indicates significance at 1%, ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 
10%. 
Columns I to VI indicate different sets of countries. Missing values in the columns reflect 
absence of data for those variables in that set of countries.   
Another important variable explaining the extent of misinvoicing is the extent of 
currency overvaluation. Exchange rate overvaluation induces devaluation expectations, 
which could induce capital flight for hedging purposes. The farther the adjustment is 
postponed, the stronger the expectation will be for the devaluation. Moreover, in some 
Latin American countries like Argentina and Mexico, the central bank and the 
government authorized transfers abroad at the official exchange rates. In such 
instances, capital flight was a direct result of overvaluation. We find that a one 
percentage point increase in overvaluation results in 0.03 to 0.07 percentage point 
increase in capital flight through import overinvoicing. The real interest rate has a sign 
opposite to may be expected. However, once we control for other variables like capital 
account openness, exchange rate regime, etc. we obtain the expected sign but the 
impact is not significant across any of the specifications. Similarly, the real interest rate 
differential, the exchange rate regime, indebtedness and inflation do not have a 
significant impact on import overinvoicing. 
 
Splitting the overall sample into developing and industrialized countries yields a 
similar result as before with bulk of the results being driven by the developing countries. 
 
 
V.  Key Results 
 
 
With the help of a combination of graphical and econometric analysis we arrive 
at the following key results: 
•  The extent of misinvoicing is seen to be higher among developing 
countries than industrialized countries over the period 1980-2005.  Also, 
misinvoicing has declined steadily in industrialized countries, while with 
developing countries, trends remain mixed. 
•  Though there is evidence of misinvoicing in countries all over the world, our 
regression results suggest that different factors are at play in affecting export 
underinvoicing and import overinvoicing. 
•  Current account deficit, custom duties and currency overvaluation are the 
main factors that impact import overinvoicing. 
•  Export underinvoicing is found to be affected by political instability, capital 
account openness, current account deficit, trade openness and external 
indebtedness. 
•  We also find that there are different factors affecting export misinvoicing in 
developing and industrialized countries. While current account deficit, capital 
account openness and political instability are the primary factors driving export 
underinvoicing in developing countries, custom duties and interest rates are 
the significant variables driving export underinvoicing in industrialized 
countries. 
 
  VI. Conclusion and Further Research 
 
 
Economists have long been aware of trade misinvoicing. The traditional 
literature has focused on evasion of custom duties and economic instability, as being the  
forces at work with misinvoicing. If misinvoicing was driven by economic instability and 
custom duties, in many emerging markets such as China and India, conditions had 
changed enough to deliver a sharp reduction in misinvoicing. The broad summary 
statistics suggest that such a reduction has not taken place. This suggests the need for 
a further exploration of the factors affecting misinvoicing. 
 
In this paper we examine the evidence in both industrial and emerging 
economies. We find that while there are many macroeconomic and institutional variables 
affecting misinvoicing, they vary in industrial and emerging economies. Moreover, the 
variables that affect export misinvoicing are different from those affecting import 
misinvoicing.  The paper highlights that custom duties and economic instability are not 
the only factors leading to capital flight through trade misinvoicing, as previously 
believed. Capital account openness, interest rate differentials and the exchange rate 
regime play an important role. 
 
There is a need for further research to understand why different institutional 
mechanisms are affecting misinvoicing in developing and industrial countries.  Moreover, 
when custom duties have been drastically reduced in developing countries post 
liberalization, why do they continue to play a vital role even today in import misinvoicing? 
We find that capital account openness plays a major role in export misinvoicing.   
However, we do not get a similar relationship in the case of import overinvoicing. In the 
latter case, we believe that the net import misinvoicing is a result of two competing 
factors - desire to keep capital out of the country leading to import overinvoicing, and the 
willingness to evade custom duties resulting in import underinvoicing. The importance of 
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Appendix 
 
A  List of Countries 
 
Industrialized Countries  Developing Countries 
Australia Algeria  Mexico 
Austria Argentina  Nigeria 
Belgium Brazil  Pakistan 
Canada Chile  Peru 
Denmark CHK  Philippines 
Finland Colombia  Poland 
France Egypt  Portugal 
Germany Greece  Romania 
Italy Hungary  Russia 
Japan India  Saudi  Arabia 
Netherlands Indonesia  Singapore 
New Zealand  Iran, I. R. of  South Africa 
Norway Ireland  Thailand 
Spain Israel  Turkey 
Sweden Korea  Ukraine 
Switzerland Kuwait  United  Arab  Emirates 
United Kingdom  Malaysia  Venezuela, Rep. Bol. 
United States     
 
B  Data Sources and Definitions 
 
Variable Source  Definition 
Trade openness  World Development 
Indicators 






Debt owed to non-residents repayable in foreign 
currency, goods or services. Includes public, 






Ratio of total customs revenue on merchandise 
goods to value of merchandise goods imported into 
the country. 
Political stability  Intra Country Risk 
Guide 
A weighted index of 12 components including 
government stability, socio-economic conditions, 
investment profile, conflicts, corruption, law and 
order and ethnic tensions. Index ranges from 0 to 
100; a higher score reflecting a more stable 
regime.  
Corruption Intra  Country  Risk 
Guide 
The corruption index ranges from 0 to 6, a higher 
number indicating a less corrupt regime. In the 
paper we take an inverse of this measure. A higher 
number hence refers to greater corruption. 
Inflation World  Development 
Indicators 





Ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP in 
constant local currency. 
Real interest rate  World Development 
Indicators 
Difference between nominal deposit rate and 
inflation rate. 




Difference between real deposit rates in the home 
country and a risk free real interest rate. Risk free 
real interest rate is proxied with real deposit rates 
prevailing in the United States. A positive real 
interest rate differential implies that the risk free 
real interest rate is higher than real interest rates 





Sum of net exports of goods, services, net income 





Ratio of GDP to current account balance. A 





A de facto classification of exchange rate index 
formulated by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
based on data on exchange rates. The index 
ranges from 1 to 5, a lower number implying a 
more flexible exchange rate regime. 
Currency 
overvaluation 
Johnson et al (2007)  As defined in the source. 
Capital account 
openness 
Chinn and Ito (2006)  The Chinn-Ito index ranges from -2.54 to 2.54, a 
higher value indicating greater financial 
openness. The index is 
the first principal component of the binary 
variables pertaining to cross border financial 
transactions based on 
IMF’s categorical enumeration reported in the 
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions. The variables are 
restrictions on capital account transaction, 
current account transaction, requiring 
surrendering of export proceeds and presence of 
multiple exchange rates. Since these variables 
account for the degree of control, Chinn and Ito 
flip their values and construct an index based on 
standardized principal components.  
C  Summary Statistics of Key Variables 
 
Variable Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min.  Max. 
 











Import Misinvoicing vis-à-vis IC  1345  -3.77  15.89  -138.43  81.65 
Net Misinvoicing vis-à-vis IC  1345  -0.92  10.69  -48.36  62.76 
Export Misinvoicing vis-à-vis 1319  -1.14  17.98  -78.94  106.03 
Import Misinvoicing vis-à-vis 1319  -1.45  15.15  -115.64  72.87 
Net Misinvoicing vis-à-vis World  1319  -1.41  8.74  -43.56  31.28 
Political Stability  1132  70.35  14.82  20.00  97.00 
Corruption 1135  3.76  1.45  0.00  6.0
Exchange Rate Rigidity  1142  3.57  1.38  1.00  5.0
Average Custom Duties  652  6.42  9.09  -0.09  66.34 
Inflation 1329  40.96  282.99  -25.70  6836.88
Real Interest Rate  1028  5.94  10.99  -91.72  88.11 
Indebtedness 616  45.05  25.72  0.74  158.57 
Capital Account Openness  1263  0.81  1.64  -1.77  2.5
Real Interest Differential  1028  -0.47  11.02  -80.12  95.34 
Trade Share  1297  69.65  49.62  11.55  456.09 
Current Account Deficit  1254  0.07  9.58  -54.67  240.50 
 Exchange Rate Overvaluation  1251  6.93  40.
























                                                                                                                                   
i  The list of countries is given in Appendix A. 
ii  The definitions and data source of the variables used are given in Appendix B. 
iii   The variables used, their source and definitions are given in Appendix B. 
iv   A positive real interest rate spread implies that the real deposit rates in the United States are 
higher than in the home country.  
 